Imagination & Creativity with Jean-Paul Sartre | Issue 32 (2023)

Existentialism

Understanding the imagination was central to Sartre's attempts to understand what it means to be human and how we should live.Marie Antoinette Pernathinks he had important insights that are still worth considering.

What is imagination? The word itself seems to be used in at least two different ways, and as this ambiguity is reflected in various studies of the imagination, it needs to be clarified. This is what I will try in the first part of this article. Then I focus on Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of imagination. I believe it offers an insight into our relationship to the world and to each other that deserves renewed attention. The conclusions drawn in the first part of the article will help defend Sartre's position against a common line of criticism.

imagination and creativity

The word "imagination" appears to be used for both (a) the ability to experience or form mental images and (b) the ability to engage in creative thinking, which may or may not involve the presence of mental images. It seems to me that, at least in some contexts, the distinction between these two meanings of the term is crucial, since the word does not refer to one but to two types of activities. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I will use the term "imagination" when referring to Imagination (a) and reserve the term "creativity" for Imagination (b).

I propose to begin by tracing a distinction between the verb 'envision' and the verb 'create'. For example, if Mr. X is desperate to own a large sum of money, we might catch him deep in thought, winning the lottery, winning enormous sums in the stock market, successfully robbing a bank, or getting rid of his wealthy wife. Mr.X's activity can be described as follows: he fulfills his wish in pictorial form, or simply he plays with some ideas that arise "in his head". But it cannot be said that he is considering concrete ways of making his wish come true: Mr X does not draw up a plan, he does not weigh up the means at his disposal, he does not weigh up the pros and cons. Using the verb 'create' to describe Mr.X's activity would be inappropriate, but using the verb 'envision' would certainly be correct.

On the other hand, if I were working on a novel whose main character was Mr.X, I would be doing a specific project. Writing a novel requires an approach that obviously differs from author to author. For example, I could go from one purely conjectural phase to another, where I work out an outline of the main plot, then I start individualizing the characters and construct the different scenes, I work out a structure, then, as I continue, Me it's clear that I have to change some of what I had previously planned. This complex sequence of actions need not necessarily resort to imagination (a), and if I were to describe what I do in a single word, the verb "create" rather than "envision" would be most appropriate and exhaustive.

Thus, unlike the verb 'imagine', the verb 'create' refers to a coherent series of acts of an inventive and productive, not simply reproductive, nature aimed at a specific result.

The same reasoning applies to the cases where we attribute imagination or creativity to a person. For example, if I see a child sitting in a chair and mimicking his father's gestures while driving, I might think the child is imaginative, but I'm unlikely to think he iscreative. This does not mean that the activity of the game is not a creative activity; Depending on the type of game, it can be a creative activity in different ways. On the other hand, if the child tells me a story that he made up, I will not be wrong in saying that he is a creative child.

On this basis, I think it fair to say that imagination refers to mental actions that are not necessarily related to the achievement of a concrete result. Creativity can resort to imagination, but the latter is not essential to its activity. What it absolutely must include is a “do” with an end product in mind. In addition, such an end product can be made public either in advance or upon request, ie it can be shown to other people and possibly evaluated by them. (It may well be that a person can compose verse but does not feel like writing it down, but that does not mean that he cannot recite or write down his poetry if he wishes).

Another way of showing this distinction is to point out that in terms of novel writing and storytelling, that is, in terms of creative activities, it would be appropriate for the artist to give me, in my opinion, his work to ask; and it would be useful if I asked such questions as "What did you do to achieve that particular effect?"; or else if I made such judgmental statements as "I don't think the character in this scene is believable." But it would be absurd for me to ask such questions or make such observations in relation to Mr. X as he is imagining winning the lottery, or the kid playing driving a car.

This analysis is further corroborated by comparing the imagined object and the created object. For example, Anne tells Mary over the phone that she has dyed her hair blonde and asks her friend if she thinks that is a good idea. Before Mary answers, she remembers Anne's face and imagines it in combination with different shades of blonde hair. What Mary is doing is imagining, and what we mean here by Anne's face as oneBildis a more or less vague thought of Mary that does not really require a confrontation with anything real outside of itself and cannot be experienced by others. The mental image is actually tied to first-person experience; moreover, it is an unsuitable object of any kind of evaluation criteria. In this respect it is similar to the expression of likes and dislikes.

So much for "imagined objects". “Created objects” differ in that they are ideas more or less fully realized with the help of certain materials or tools. For example, consider a writer's description of Anne. To be identified as the novelist's creation, Anne's facial features must meet requirements that the image does not: Anne's face must be capable of evoking different feelings in different viewers, it must be capable of being evaluated against appropriate criteria, and it must be his own Possess an identity that distinguishes it from any other face, even Anne's face as it appears in the real world if the novelist has used the real Anne as a model for his character.

In discussing creative activity, we should not forget one essential feature that distinguishes it from other types of activity: a created object is intended as an artifact that achieves an original synthesis of form and content and is in no way comparable to something already existing in nature or social world. Thus, in the example above, Anne as a fictional character is an entirely different being from Anne as she is in the world that inspired the novelist; only the former is a product of human creativity.

"Creativity" can be contrasted with "repetition", "routine", "habit"; "Creative" can be contrasted with "conventional" and "conformal". The first group of terms refers to specific types of actions or actions, the latter to a person's overall lifestyle. In both cases it can be seen that the words are more or less explicitly value-laden. “Imagination”, on the other hand, does not function as the opposite of the above terms. In fact, by definition, creative action cannot be simultaneously repetitive and predictable, while imagination and repetition can be compatible—I can imagine the same person or situation in the same way an infinite number of times. I would be self-contradictory if I claimed that my boyfriend's lifestyle is rather creative, while at the same time affirming that he is a completely conventional person. On the contrary, it wouldn't be a contradiction in terms to say that my friend is openly conforming to societal conventions while imagining himself to be Jim Morrison of the Doors. Nonetheless, it is arguable that imagination can be part of a person's character and therefore of their way of life, if they often manifest a tendency to escape from the current situation in order to think of possible and impossible situations or to get lost in daydreams. This also lends itself, in certain contexts, to moral considerations that will form part of my discussion of Sartre's position.

Jean-Paul Sartre: Conceit and bad faith

Sartre dedicated two major works to the nature of imagination. InThe psychology of the imagination(1940) he drew a sharp boundary between imagination and perception. He asserted that consciousness can either perceive or imagine, but that the two types of action can never be combined. But, according to his critics, this contradicts our ordinary perception and aesthetic experience, where perceived and imagined elements are often intertwined.

An answer to this criticism requires consideration of Sartre's metaphysics. He uses the term "reality" in at least two ways. First, it denotes the commonsense reality, ie the familiar world made up of trees, houses, streets, people and so on. But he also uses it in a technical sense to refer to "being," that is, the ultimate and fundamental structure underlying what we call "reality" in the everyday sense. Let's use the phrase "first level of reality" to refer to common sense reality and the phrase "second level of reality" to refer to the real in the metaphysical sense. Access to the second level is normally only possible via the first level. The second level consists of two very different ways of being, namely being-in-itself (be in itself) and being for oneself (be for yourself). Being-in-itself applies to everything that is unaware of its own existence and that is simply and completely itself, like a stone or a book. Self-sufficiency is the mode of existence enjoyed by all that is aware of its own existence and capable of making decisions about "what to be". It includes values, meanings and so on, which being-in-itself obviously does not. The two ways of being are structurally related, but cannot merge into one another.

Based on this rather sketchy picture, the above criticism can be answered as follows. In ordinary experience, the in-itself always appears to be pervaded by the projects of the for-itself, given the necessary interrelationship between the two modes of being: the first level of reality is structured around human meanings, values, and purposes. Through philosophical reflection, Sartre seeks to show that such meaningful relationships are not an integral part of what is fundamentally real (second level). Their being is based on the inner relationship between the in-itself and the for-itself, and they disappear the moment the for-itself decides to receive others. In other words, they are not inherent aspects of the two modes of being, but depend on the For-itself for their existence. This is the status of the imaginary: it has a kind of reality only so long as it is carried by a for-itself, but it can never pass into the in-itself. Look at a portrait of my friend Peter. Sartre would agree that in our ordinary experience of looking at the portrait, theanalogue, that is, the material component of the portrait (the canvas, the frame, the paint) blends with theimaginaryPart of the portrait (i.e. the image of Peter). But, he would say, philosophical reflection can reveal the characteristic ontological status of the various elements: their being depends on a relationship, not a fusion, between in-itself and for-itself. So the above critique does not take into account Sartre's ontology or the way in which he uses philosophy. Sartre does not deny that in ordinary experience the real is always mixed up with the imaginary. On the contrary, hestressedThe point, because in order to rid us of this false view of reality, philosophy can be a guide to action and therefore attain its full importance.

A distinction between imagination and creativity, along the lines of the previous section, may be a key to understanding why Sartre insists on a strict separation between the analogue and the imaginary, bringing us into the terrain of ethics. Just as the imaginative consciousness, from the point of view of common sense, fuses the analogue and the imaginary into a synthetic unity, so it performs a similar synthesis between the in-itself and the for-itself in that existential attitude which inbeing and nothingSartre calls "in bad faith" (bad faith). He gives the example of a café waiter. The waiter carries out his tasks with mechanical precision, thus achieving an imaginary synthesis between what he isintendedsimply being a café waiter, i.e. an in-itself, and what he is, namely a distant (i.e. a self-confident) café waiter. Instead of really being himself, he plays the role of a cafe waiter. Another famous example from the same book involves a similar synthesis. A character Sartre calls the "Defender of Sincerity" attempts to persuade a homosexual friend to openly profess what he is, where "is" means a being-in-itself. But, says Sartre, what the homosexual is effectively asked to do is to synthesize their past actions and gestures into an image with which they identify now and forever. It follows that in order to become one with this self-image, he would have to live his life constantly repeating those attitudes and actions that qualify and validate his way of being homosexual. Not only would this be a monotonous and repetitive way of being, but he would have renounced his own way of being as an individual in order to unreflectively cling to a pattern given to him by the other: to be identified as the "typical" homosexual.

Thus, it can be argued that trying to hide one's true nature (second level of reality, the for-oneself) throughout one's life through an imaginary identification with a self-image ultimately leads to the repetition of the same pattern of behavior. For after identification at the imaginary level, the person concerned mistakenly (hence "bad faith") perceives himself as that imaginary being and consequently unable to act or be anything else in any other way. This includes denying yourself the opportunity to consciously choose what you want to be and how you want to live your life. It involves turning away from the continuous, never-ending creation of one's self.

A possible argument against this conclusion could be the following. The person in bad faith is not just imagining things. To the extent that he identifies with his image, he actually undertakes complex actions and carries out projects, all of which involve creative activities.

This objection, I think, fails on at least two counts. First, not every type of action taken upon the real can be called "creative." The simple fact that the person is acting in bad faith from a model given to himself or given to him by others does not necessarily imply that he is engaging in some creative type of activity. The assembly line worker performs specific work on matter, manipulates tools, follows instructions or models. Nevertheless, one would not say that he acts creatively. On the contrary, his work is limited to the reproduction of sets of objects (or constitutive parts of objects), and his actions are to a large extent predetermined, repetitive, and predictable, as is their end product. Similarly, by conforming to an extrinsic self-image, the malicious person reproduces through their actions a “serialized” lifestyle that makes them a “social product”. It might be helpful to recall that at one point in the previous section I emphasized an essential criterion that the created object should fulfil: In order to be identified as a product of creative activity, the object should have a certain uniqueness, a certain stubborn refusal to be serialized and generalized. I also emphasized the contradiction between creativity and repetitive actions and between being creative and being conventional; and the compatibility or possibility of coexistence between imagination and repeatability and imagination and conventionality. All of this seems consistent with my reading of Sartre's text.

Second, acting in bad faith seems like the child I mentioned earlier playing as an adult by sitting in a chair and mimicking his father's car driving gestures. Therefore, it is an imaginative rather than a creative way of doing things. Consider the similarities: the child and the malicious person both support their imaginations by assuming certain postures and actions, but the reality is far from approaching the image they project onto it and can, given their age of the child in the family in the one case and in Sartre's ontological framework in the other. This transformation of reality, which is impossible for factual or ontological reasons, takes place through an imaginary act that fills the gap between reality and image and leaves the former untouched, at least in relevant points.

However, an important difference between the child and the bad faith person should be emphasized. Play is part of the child's self-development, which could be seen as a creative process. Furthermore, the child plays in different ways and plays different roles in different situations within the spontaneous, childlike universe to which it belongs. Bad faith, on the other hand, infects one's entire existence, shaping it to reproduce and repeat a particular way of being.

It is our relationships with each other and with society that support bad faith most effectively, and this underscores its moral importance. In fact, it is clear that the malicious syntheses, however conceited, are sustained by certain behaviors and thus have a real and often devastating impact on how people interact and ways of life reproduce together.

What Sartre means by "authenticity," which is the fundamental positive value in his ethical perspective, consists in part in shattering those images, myths, and conventional labels in which individuals lock themselves and thus limit the scope of their freedom, and in which creative construction of the human world, a task always open to the dimension of the 'possible'.

Today's world is often described as an "image culture". If so, then Sartre's theory and its invitation to creative rethinking of reality deserve our appreciation and attention.

© Maria Antoinetta Perna 2001

Maria Perna received her PhD on Sartre from Birkbeck College in London and now teaches at the University of Calabria in Italy.

Further reading
Jeaun Paul Sartre,The psychology of the imagination(1940).
Jeaun Paul Sartre,being and nothing(1943).
Edward S. Casey „Sartre über Imagination“, inThe philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, (Open Court, 1981). Casey addresses the type of criticism of Sartre's theory of imagination that will be considered in this article.